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ABSTRACT  
In this work we demonstrate the use of a dual antenna 
receiver that employs a receiver-autonomous angle-of-
arrival spoofing countermeasure. This defense is 
conjectured to be effective against all but the most 
sophisticated spoofing attempts.  The technique is based 
on observation of L1 carrier differences between multiple 
antennas referenced to a common oscillator. 
We first employ a moderately sophisticated spoofer to 
"fool" a single-antenna civil receiver.  We then deploy the 
same attack after augmenting the receiver with an 
additional antenna and with receiver-autonomous spoof-
detection software.  The work discusses the experimental 
results together with various issues related to sensitivity, 
probability of false alarm, impact of carrier multipath, 
line-bias-calibration, and physical setup and security. 
We suggest that this work is important to the community 
as it provides experimental validation of a low-cost 
technique for receiver-autonomous spoofing detection.  
Furthermore, the technique, when combined with physical 
security of the antenna installation, provides a strong 
defense against even a sophisticated attack. 
The receiver employed is an L1-only civil GPS receiver 
with multiple antenna capability. The GPS chipset 
employed is the venerable GP2015/GP2021 that has been 
freely available for over a decade. As such, this receiver is 
representative of many civil receivers in use today for a 
variety of applications.  Multiple antennas are enabled 
either through multiple independent RF front ends and 
correlators or via antenna multiplexing into a single RF 
front end and correlator bank. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation assessed 
the U.S. Transportation infrastructure's vulnerability to 
civil GPS disruption [1].  Their report, known as the 
Volpe report, warned that “as GPS further penetrates into 
civil infrastructure, it becomes a tempting target that 
could be exploited by individuals, groups or countries 
hostile to the U.S.” Among other type of interference, the 
report considers civil GPS spoofing, an intentional 
interference whereby a GPS receiver is fooled into 
tracking counterfeit GPS signals. Spoofing is more 
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sinister than intentional jamming because the targeted 
receiver cannot detect a spoofing attack and so can be 
fooled into generating data that is hazardously misleading.  
 
Previous work into spoofing countermeasures has been 
carried out, notably in an internal memorandum from the 
MITRE Corporation in which the author, Edwin L. Key 
appears to have examined spoofing and spoofing 
countermeasures in detail [2]. The memorandum 
recommends the following techniques for countering 
spoofing: 
1.Amplitude discrimination 
2.Time-of-arrival discrimination 
3.Consistency of navigation inertial measurement unit 
(IMU) cross check 
4.Polarization discrimination 
5.Angle-of-arrival discrimination 
6.Cryptographic authentication 
 
This paper concerns an implementation of angle-of-arrival 
discrimination for spoofing detection and employs two or 
more antennas. Of the proposed techniques, angle-of-
arrival discrimination coupled with physical security of 
the antennas provides significant protection and is 
relatively easy to implement with inexpensive single 
frequency receiver technology. 
 
SPOOFING SCENARIOS 
Spoofing scenarios can be broadly divided among static 
and dynamic cases.  
 
Static  
A static example is that of a timing receiver that is 
deployed to synchronize a communications network.  
GPS time synchronization is also important for the 
electrical grid and for global trading synchronization.  In 
all such cases, a GPS antenna is situated with clear view 
of the sky, typically on top of a building or a 
communications tower. A receiver-generated pulse per 
second (PPS) is used as the time reference.  One can 
envisage a scenario where the spoofer knows the 
approximate location of the targeted receiver antenna. 
Spoofer hardware and a directional antenna could be used 
to mount an attack at a distance of hundred meters or 
more. As discussed in [3], the general approach would be: 
1. “grow” a replica signal “in the shadow” of the 
correlation peak for each satellite, replicating the 
received GPS navigation data 
2. increase the power of the spoofing signal to 
overcome the GPS signal 
3. slew the generated signals to be consistent with a 
desired GPS position/time 
Clearly, this technique could be used to fool a timing 
receiver into generating a PPS that is incorrect. 
 
Dynamic 
In fishing waters controlled by the European Commission, 
large fishing vessels are required to carry a GPS logger 
[4]. The logger records the voyage of the vessel and 
provides the data to the licensing agency.  Naturally the 
data can be used to detect passage into waters for which 
the vessel is not licensed.  This is an example of a 
dynamic scenario where the operator of the vessel is 
motivated by financial gain to spoof the onboard receiver. 
In this case of “complicit spoofing” the intent of the  
operator is to log a fictional voyage that does not disclose 
illegal fishing activities. In such a situation, the complicit 
user could potentially disconnect the GPS antenna and 
attach instead a local GPS signal generator. 
 
There are other dynamic scenarios (largely of Hollywood 
creation) where a malicious spoofer intends to guide an 
aircraft into the ground or a mountain side. In our opinion, 
this would be very difficult to achieve technically and 
appears to be unlikely in practice. Nonetheless, the 
mitigation technique presented here could be effective in 
detecting the presence of a spoofer in these “Hollywood 
Scenarios.” 
 
SPOOFER CATEGORIES 
GPS signal generator 
Spoofers in this category are GPS signal generators such 
as can be purchased from several vendors.  The RF output 
is amplified and transmitted, possibly using a directional 
antenna.  In this case, the transmitted signals are not 
related to the GPS signals being received from satellites 
in the locality and the navigation data does not replicate 
the currently active navigation data or timing.  Although a 
receiver could be fooled by this approach, (particularly if 
the target receiver is first jammed and forced to 
reacquire), the spoofing signal typically looks like noise 
to a tracking receiver. 
 
GPS receiver based Spoofer 
Spoofers in this category are coupled to a GPS receiver.  
The GPS receiver tracks satellite signals at a location and 
decodes the navigation data. 
 
Figure 1: Cornell GRID software-defined GPS 
receiver 
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The spoofer then generates a signal that mimics the 
incident satellite signals in all respects.  The spoofer can 
potentially add a calculated offset to each satellite signal 
to compensate for a specified geometric offset to the 
target GPS antenna. The spoofer is also able to vary the 
signal strength of the constituent signals. This 
configuration has one transmit antenna, and is moderately 
sophisticated. A spoofer of this type has been created as 
discussed in [3]. Although the technical knowledge to 
create such a spoofer is not widespread the required parts 
are freely available and may be purchased for a few 
hundred dollars. Figure 1 shows a photograph of the 
Cornell “GRID” dual frequency software-defined GPS 
receiver. As an example of a spoofing platform, the 
Cornell GRID receiver can simultaneously track 12 C/A 
channels and generate 8 C/A spoofing channels.  Coupled 
with the simple RF hardware shown in Figure 2, this 
platform has been used to investigate the challenges 
involved in mounting a spoofing attack. 
 
 
Figure 2: RF transmitter prototype hardware 
 
The hardware described has been used successfully to 
spoof several different single frequency GPS receivers. 
 
Sophisticated GPS receiver based Spoofer 
A sophisticated spoofer design is similar to the GPS 
receiver based spoofer discussed above, but employs 
multiple transmit antennas.  Furthermore, the spoofer is 
able to vary the carrier and code phase outputs that are 
transmitted by each antenna and to control the relative 
code/carrier phases among these transmit antennas.  To 
create such a spoofer is technically difficult for several 
practical reasons. 
 
EXPERIMENAL SETUP 
Figure 3 shows a photograph of an AutoFarm roof array. 
This assembly includes a pair of L1 GPS antennas 
separated by 1.46 meters.  Between the antennas is the 
GPS receiver itself. This assembly was designed and is 
used for vehicle navigation and automatic control. It is 
used in the present work because the internal firmware is 
easily modified and because the assembly produces L1 
carrier phase measurements from both antennas 
referenced to a common internal oscillator.  The internal 
GPS receiver is based on the venerable GP2015/GP2021 
chipset and uses Novariant proprietary software. There is 
nothing special about the hardware platform itself. The 
platform choice was merely convenient for the authors. 
 
 
Figure 3: AutoFarm GPS antenna array 
 
In the experimental setup, the assembly is set up on the 
rooftop in a known and fixed orientation.  We chose a 
level orientation in which the baseline between the 
antennas is oriented along the (true) North-South axis. 
Although we are employing a single receiver and 
common oscillator, the differential phase technique 
employed is equally applicable to two separate receivers 
each with a single antenna and oscillator, provided the 
baseline between the antennas is known. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Antenna diversity geometry for a single 
satellite 
 
Figure 4 shows the geometry for a single satellite: 
s is a unit line of sight (LOS) vector to a GPS satellite 
b is the baseline vector between the two antenna in units 
of L1 cycles. 
Lines of constant phase emanating from the distant 
satellite are represented by parallel lines orthogonal to s 
and separated by the wavelength of the L1 carrier 
frequency. 
A B
receiver 
S
b 
λ 
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For the ith satellite, a scalar equation for the L1 carrier 
phase difference dϕi between the two antennas is given 
(in units of L1 cycles) by 
 
 
 
Equation 1 
 
Where: 
b is the baseline vector between the antennas (in the body 
frame) in units of L1 cycles 
A is a direction cosine matrix to rotate vectors in the East-
North-Up (ENU) frame to the body frame 
isˆ   is the unit line of sight (LOS) vector to satellitei in the 
ENU frame 
Ni is an arbitrary integer ambiguity for satellite i 
B is a constant “line bias” or time varying delta-clock 
term (depending on implementation) 
γi is the summation of all carrier phase error terms for 
satellitei 
 
Equation 1 ignores terms due to the ionosphere and 
troposphere as these are common mode to sub millimeter 
level with the assumed meter-level baseline between the 
antennas. The expression bTAsi should be recognized as 
the inner product between vectors si and b. For a dynamic 
case, the LOS vector si is known in the ENU frame, but 
the moving baseline b is known in the body frame. The 
direction cosine matrix A denotes the attitude of the 
antenna array and is necessary to compute the inner 
product. (In other contexts, equation 1 can be used to 
determine the direction cosine matrix A when it is desired 
to calculate the attitude of the antenna array.) 
In the following, it is assumed that the inner product 
between si and b is known. For a fixed (rooftop) 
installation the attitude of the antenna array is assumed to 
be a known by design or pre-survey. For the case of a 
dynamic (vehicle) installation, the attitude of the antenna 
array is assumed to be determined by an orientation 
sensor (such as an inertial attitude sensor) that is not 
susceptible to GPS spoofing 
 
For a dual-antenna receiver with a common oscillator, B 
is a constant associated with the difference in the 
electrical length of the pathways from the antennas to the 
receiver. For a receiver with separate oscillators (one for 
each antenna), B is a non-constant bias dominated by the 
clock offsets between the two oscillators. In either case, B 
is common for all satellites. 
 
Figure 5 shows a plot of delta phases (dϕ) for 4 satellites 
in track for a period of approximately one hour. The data 
were generated by the antenna array shown in Figure 3 
with the antennas aligned in a North-South orientation. In 
Figure 5, the integer (Ni) for each satellite has been set to 
an arbitrary value for convenient plotting. Note that: 
• The observed change in dϕ over time is due to 
satellite motion 
• The rate of change in dϕ is proportional to the 
baseline length 
• Noise on the measurements is due to carrier 
multipath and carrier phase noise. 
• Based on the known attitude expressed in A and 
the known line bias B, the expected values of the 
delta phases are plotted 0.1 cycles below the 
measurement data (for visual clarity). In this 
case, the attitude was known to approximately 
0.1 degrees in pitch and 0.3 degrees in azimuth. 
 
Figure 5: Carrier phase deltas dϕi for 4 GPS satellites 
over one hour 
 
The plot in Figure 5 illustrates the basic idea for spoofing 
detection using multiple antennas. If the dϕ measurements 
do not agree with the expected phase profiles within 
bounds set by the expected noise and attitude uncertainty, 
then a spoofing signal is identified. As shown in Figure 6, 
a spoofer transmitting from a single antenna has a very 
different geometry from that of a receiver tracking GPS 
satellites distributed across the sky. Consistent with the 
geometry, the dϕi profiles for a point transmitter must all 
overlay each other except for contributions due to 
multipath and phase noise. 
 
The spoofing detection algorithm we implemented is 
therefore straightforward: 
1. The expected delta phases (dϕi) are calculated 
based on known attitude and line bias B. 
2. The measured delta phases are compared 
(modulo 1 cycle) with the expected delta phases. 
3. For each satellite, the error between the expected 
and the measured data is calculated every 500 ms 
(or other update rate as desired). 
4. Based on an error threshold that is a function of 
satellite elevation, expected worst-case multipath 
and attitude uncertainty, a limited up-down 
counter is incremented or decremented. 
iii
T
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5. If the up-down counter reaches a specified 
maximum (based on sample rate and time to 
alarm) a spoofing detection alarm is triggered. 
 
The algorithm described requires that the attitude of 
the antenna array be known. This is not a great 
problem for a static array, however, for the dynamic 
case it requires integration with an independent 
attitude reference. An alternate implementation to 
detect a point transmitter could attempt to detect the 
case wherein all delta phases overlie each other 
within an error bound sufficient to accommodate 
worst-case multipath and carrier noise. Such an 
approach would have to deal with rare cases where 
the true satellite geometry happens to cause all delta 
phases to lie within proximity of each other (modulo 
one cycle). This situation will occur on occasion and 
if not handled will lead to a false alarm condition. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Antenna diversity geometry for a single 
satellite and point transmitter 
 
 
For a spoofer to defeat the algorithm as implemented, the 
spoofing system must emulate the expected carrier phase 
deltas between the pair of antennas for all satellites in 
track. As illustrated in Figure 6, it is not possible for even 
a sophisticated spoofer to emulate this geometry for 
several satellites with a point transmitter. It is possible 
that a sophisticated spoofer with two separate points of 
transmission could defeat the algorithm. However this 
would also require the spoofer to: 
• know the geometry of the GPS antenna array 
• locate a matched transmitter antenna very close 
to each GPS antenna 
• deal with other difficult problems associated 
with multipath, signal leakage and self 
interference 
Such tampering is not possible without physical access to 
the antenna installation. Of course, the spoofing defense 
described herein is straightforwardly extended to use 3 or 
more antennas, making a multi-transmitter spoofing 
attack even more difficult. For this reason, we believe the 
use of antenna diversity and physical security leads to a 
robust defense against even a sophisticated spoofing 
attack in the case of a static installation. 
 
Figure 7: Pair of CMC AllStar single frequency GPS 
receivers with independent oscillators 
 
The implementation described above uses a single 
receiver with a common oscillator. In this case the line-
bias (B) is a predetermined constant. If B is not known or 
non-constant, one can simply remove it by subtracting 
one measurement from all the others. (typically one 
subtracts the measurement from a high elevation satellite). 
With this modification and with a commensurate increase 
in the error threshold to accommodate increased phase 
noise and multipath, the algorithm is then easily 
implemented with separate receivers and antennas. In the 
multi-receiver case, it is only required that vector between 
the two antennas is constant and known.  Figure 7 shows 
a pair of low-cost, single frequency CMC AllStar 
receivers. A pair of similar receivers can be used to 
provide a timing reference (~50 ns) that is robust to even 
a sophisticated single-transmitter spoofing attack. In the 
case where an existing receiver is used to provide GPS 
timing, it is also possible to upgrade the installation by 
adding a second receiver and antenna.  The algorithm 
described can then be used to achieve protection against 
spoofing attack. 
 
INDOOR EXPERIMENT 
After the Receiver Autonomous Spoofing Detection 
(RASD) software was developed, the antenna array 
depicted in Figure 3 was mounted on the roof and the 
software enabled. The algorithm was tested for several 
days in an “unspoofed” setting to validate that spurious 
(false) detections were not flagged. A detection threshold 
of +/-0.1 cycles was used for zenith satellites, with a 
linear increase to +/-0.25 cycles for satellites at the 
horizon. These thresholds were found empirically. 
 
The intended experiment was to employ the hardware 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2 to implement a spoofing 
attack against the GPS receiver and antenna array 
A B
receiver 
S
b 
spoofer 
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transmit 
antenna 
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depicted in Figure 3 in a situation where the array was 
mounted to the roof with a clear view of the sky as 
follows: 
1. Create a spoofing attack against the test receiver 
without the RASD firmware and validate (using 
an oscilloscope) that the spoofer was able to 
drive the generated PPS away from truth. 
2. Enable the RASD firmware and execute the 
same attack. This time validate that the receiver 
was able to detect the attack and raise an alarm. 
This plan was complicated by the necessity to perform the 
experiment outside and with a clear view of the sky.  The 
issue: transmitting outdoors in the L1 frequency band is 
illegal! Moreover, an early version of the spoofing system 
in Figures 1 and 2 suffered from a software bug (since 
resolved) that prevented reliable transmission of the 
spoofing signal. 
In view of these problems, it was decided to simplify the 
experiment and move indoors.  The revised experiment 
used a “real” GPS signal from a rooftop mounted GPS 
antenna. The L1 band was amplified and re-transmitted 
indoors from a point source as illustrated in Figure 8. 
(This setup is identical to that occasionally used at trade 
shows to allow GPS receiver vendors to demonstrate 
active GPS receivers indoors without cable runs to the 
roof)  
 
 
Figure 8: Indoor Experimental Setup 
 
The antenna array was likewise moved indoors and 
mounted in proximity to the re-transmit antenna. In this 
environment the receiver was able to track the re-
transmitted signal without cycle slips when the range to 
the transmit antenna was less than approximately 6 
meters. The indoor receiver was also able to decode all 
navigation data and calculate a position fix (the position 
of the rooftop antenna). Having calculated the position fix 
and the LOS vectors, the receiver immediately detected 
and flagged a spoofer signal.  The delta phase profiles of 
seven satellite signals that were tracked during the indoor 
experiment are plotted in Figure 9. Consistent with the 
geometry, one may observe that all delta phases from the 
point source lie on top of each other.  Although this 
experiment did not detect an actual spoofer, the situation 
is sufficiently representative that the approach and 
software implementation were considered successful. 
 
Figure 9: Experimental delta phase results with point 
transmitter 
 
DYNAMIC PLATFORM 
While attempts to spoof a static target to affect timing or 
position integrity may be a more obvious threat, there are 
also cases where attempts may be made to spoof a non-
static target (recall the foregoing example of the fishing 
vessel skipper who desires to spoof an onboard GPS-
based monitoring unit to fish undetected in forbidden 
waters). 
 
 
Figure 10: Crossbow AHRS440 MEMS based 
Attitude Sensor 
 
Rooftop Antenna 
Indoor 
Retransmit 
Antenna 
Indoor Antenna Array
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In this case the multi-antenna spoofing defense is aided 
by an independent attitude sensor. A MEMS-based 
attitude sensor may be sufficient for this purpose if the 
antenna baselines are kept small. Consider an antenna 
baseline of 0.36 meters and the Crossbow AHRS440 
MEMS based attitude sensor shown in Figure 10. 
Accepting a 1σ attitude accuracy of 1 degree about each 
axis, a 3σ attitude error will result in a worst case phase 
error of approximately 0.1 cycles. Applying alarm bounds 
widened sufficiently to accommodate this attitude 
uncertainty in addition to worst-case carrier multipath and 
phase noise, one concludes that a low cost MEMS attitude 
sensor could be used in cooperation with multiple 
antennas to provide spoofing detection for many dynamic 
situations. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The use of antenna diversity using either multiple separate 
receivers or a multi antenna single-oscillator receiver can 
be used to defend against intentional GPS spoofing. This 
is because the use of multiple antennas greatly increases 
the technical difficulty required to mount a successful 
spoofing attack. In general, an additional spoofer 
transmitter is required for each additional GPS antenna.  
Furthermore, a spoofer would have to locate each transmit 
antenna in close physical proximity to the appropriate 
GPS antenna in the array. If the GPS antennas of a static 
installation are further protected by physical security it is 
possible to create a robust defense against even a 
sophisticated spoofing attack. 
One can broadly divide GPS applications into static and 
dynamic cases. In static cases it is feasible to construct 
and survey an antenna array and provide physical security 
to the antenna array. One time survey of the fixed array is 
sufficient to enable receiver autonomous spoofing 
detection (RASD). 
In dynamic cases, it is possible to determine the attitude 
of the antenna array with sufficient accuracy from a non-
GPS-based sensor. Inexpensive MEMS-based attitude 
sensors could provide sufficient attitude accuracy to aid 
detection of intentional spoofing. For the case of a 
complicit user, the presence of multiple antennas makes it 
difficult to intentionally defeat the system by direct 
injection of an artificial GPS signal. The cost of the 
required attitude sensor and the probability of false or 
missed detection may be adjusted by the tradeoff between 
baseline length and attitude sensor accuracy. The 
technology to enable multi-antenna spoofing detection is 
freely and immediately available using any of the 
numerous GPS receivers that produce L1 carrier phase 
observables. 
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